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Abstract 
Unforeseen difficulties arise along with the government measures whose object is not to expropriate or to 
nationalize the foreign investment, but to deprive the foreign investors of the rights attached to their investments. 
These measures are generally known as measures of indirect expropriation or nationalization. When asked 
about what falls into the concept of indirect expropriation, a simple answer can not be given easily, but the 
circumstances in which these measures may occur can be described and discussed. These measures could be 
grouped as follows: forced sale of property; forced sales of shares of an investment through a corporate vehicle; 
indigenization measures; taking control of investment management; determination of others to take physical 
property; failure to provide protection when there is interference with the foreign ownership; administrative 
decisions that cancel licenses and permits required for foreign businesses to operate in the host state; exorbitant 
taxation; the expulsion of the foreign investor contrary to the international law; harassment (e.g. freezing of the 
bank accounts). 
This paper therefore argues that in practice there are many situations which may be analysed as measures of 
indirect expropriation.  
 
Keywords: indirect expropriation, host state, taking, dispossession, foreign investor. 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper argues that in practice there are many situations which may be analysed as 
measures of indirect expropriation; however, the law can provide a basis to answer the above 
mentioned question, but the circumstances leading to the question can scarcely be determined. 
As a general principle, a state may do whatever it wants on its territory. Modern assertion of 
sovereignty in the economic sphere is also carried by the principles of economic self-determination 
and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The right to control the economic affairs of the 
state is one of the rights that European countries have supported and exercised regularly. This is an 
inherent aspect of state sovereignty: to control all people, incidents and objects found on its territory. 
Due to the principle of states equality, there is no reason why the same right should be exercised by 
all States
1. 
It is interesting that in the international economical law the minimum standard of international 
existence is being used. The content of this standard is difficult to identify in a concrete manner. In 
addition to the rule on compensation for expropriation and settlement of disputes through a court 
which is outside the state host, it appears that there are no further guidance on the content of this 
standard. It is said that the assessment of compensation by a foreign court, and the requirements that 
expropriation is discriminatory and for a public purpose under all the international minimum 
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standard. Besides the rules regarding to compensation for expropriation advanced by developed 
countries, it seems that there are no other rules associated with the international minimum standard
2. 
The right to property is a human right and this right must be respected also for foreigners, so, 
if his property is taken, he must be compensated. Major conventional sources of human rights such as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights do not contain references to the right to property. Instead, the Protocol. no. 1 to the European 
Convention of Human Rights proclaims this right. However, the case law generated under the 
provisions on property rights does not recognize a right to property without reservation. Other human 
rights conventions recognize this right, but also the right of the state to interfere with the right to 
property when there is a public interest. 
The  treatment of foreign investment is defined as the set of principles and rules of 
international and national law governing the international investment, since its creation until its 
liquidation. Principles and rules of international law can be derived either from non-conventional 
sources and, in particular, from the general principles of international law or conventional sources, 
treaties and agreements, both multilateral and bilateral. 
The national principles and rules are developed not by the investor’s home state, but by the 
host state. These laws and regulations translate the host state policy choices regarding the 
international investors. These political choices vary from state to state depending on a number of 
considerations, in this case there are three types of legislations or regulations - legislation and 
regulations aiming a policy of incitement, control or deterrence, as underlines the famous professor 
Carreau
3. 
 
Paper content 
 
The transfers from the private sector to the public sector are becoming rare. The priority 
became the transfer from public sector to the private sector. In the 1960s and 1970s, the states from 
the South used expropriation and nationalization very often for the investments made by the Northern 
states and in the 1980s and 1990s privatizations were imposed, in the Northern and in the Southern 
states, as well as in the Western and in the Eastern states
4. These transfers do not rise the same 
problems in international economic law. 
Thus, there are transfers negotiated between the private transferor and the public transferee 
(there is no interest for them in the international economic law, because they are made through 
contractual operations, revealing at the same time microeconomics and micro-legal
5) and forced 
transfers from the private sector to the public sector, towards which we turn our attention. 
The generic term is taking
6, which we encounter frequently in the protection clauses of 
bilateral instruments. This term is not great because it implies that the private investor not to be 
deprived only of the right of possession. The measure of taking is depriving the investor of the 
investment essential rights for the benefit of the public authority, irrespective of how the taking was 
made and whether or not it would be consistent with the international law. 
But within the category of measures of taking, there are some specific differences. First, 
expropriation and nationalization are the most important forms of dispossession. Expropriation and 
nationalization are acts of public power which cause the transfer of ownership from the private sector 
to the public sector, with some differences between the two notions. Expropriation results from an 
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administrative measure, while nationalization arises from a legislative measure. Expropriation is 
made under judicial control, while nationalization is beyond any control. Asymmetry of these 
procedures is translated into economic and legal realities. Expropriation concerns individual property 
while nationalization concerns a collection of goods which are not necessarily individualized. 
Expropriation is to satisfy a need of general interest, but for a local scope, nationalization is to satisfy 
a need of general interest, but for a national scope. 
Expropriation and nationalization should respect the principle of compensation. If this 
principle is respected, they are considered legitimate under international law, if not respected, they 
are considered illegal under international law. In other words, expropriation or nationalization which 
does not respect the principle of compensation would be distorted in relation to the qualification 
attached to it by its author. Thus, the respective measure of expropriation or nationalization would 
obtain the character of a spoliation
7. 
Thirdly, seizure, within the meaning of many Western countries, has a special place in the 
category of generic measures of takings. Expropriation and nationalization are two different forms of 
public transfers, while the seizure is a penalty, it punishes individual behavior, considered 
reprehensible by the law. Thus, it can be stated that seizure punishes economic crimes. By definition, 
it excludes granting of any compensation. 
Unforeseen difficulties arise with the governmental measures whose purpose is not to 
expropriate or to nationalize the foreign investment, but to deprive investors of rights attached to 
their investments. Some international instruments mention in different terms these measures 
(sometimes these differences are significant) in order to subjugate them to the same principles and 
rules of expropriation or nationalization measures.  
These measures generally known as indirect measures of expropriation or nationalization are 
not new. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCJI) and the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) have ruled on the government interference threshold that would have been taken as indirect 
expropriation or nationalization - PCJI: the case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (1926), the case 
of Oscar Chinnor (1934) and ICJ: the Barcelona Traction case (1970). The same guidelines are 
found in Starrett
8 and Tippetts
9 cases of the famous Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. 
Therefore, we can state that the concept of indirect measures is not new. But what is new is 
the context in which these indirect measures are taken. If in the past, it was about individual actions, 
in the present it is about non discriminatory general measures taken for a public interest, such as 
environmental protection. 
Defining  indirect takings becomes difficult because there are diverse ways of affecting 
property interests. These types of taking have been identified as “disguised expropriation”, to 
indicate that they are not visibly recognisable as expropriations or as “creeping expropriations”
10, to 
indicate that they bring about the slow and insidious strangulation of the interests of the foreign 
investor. In Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. v. Egypt
11, indirect expropriation was 
described as “measures taken by a state the effect of which is to deprive the investor of the use and 
benefit of his investment even though he may retain nominal ownership of the respective rights”.  
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Moreover, the awards of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal have been a fruitful source for 
identifying such types of taking. The Tribunal dealt with types of taking that took place in the context 
of a revolutionary upheaval following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, and the propositions the 
Tribunal formulated may not have relevance outside the context of the events that attended that 
upheaval.  
The assimilation of indirect expropriation to direct expropriation is seen as crucial, as it builds 
a platform for an analysis of the remedies that are to be provided
12. 
As mentioned above, the types of indirect taking that could amount to expropriation 
(involving also conduct by the state) have been identified in the doctrine
13 and in arbitral awards. 
Unless the conduct of those committing the acts is directly attributable to the state, the taking cannot 
involve state responsibility. 
Professor Sornarajah has done an impresive work by grouping these different types of taking 
as follows:  
1)  forced sales of property;  
2)  forced sales of shares in an investment through a corporate vehicle;  
3) indigenisation  measures;   
4)  taking over management control of the investment;  
5)  inducing others to take over the property physically;  
6)  failure to provide protection when there is interference with the property of the foreign 
investor; 
7) administrative decisions which cancel licences and permits necessary for the foreign 
business to function within the state;  
8)  exorbitant taxation;  
9)  expulsion of the foreign investor contrary to international law; and 
10) acts of harassment such as the freezing of bank accounts.  
  
Using the information obtained from professor Sornarajah, we will discuss point by point the 
above mentioned types of indirect takings. 
 
1)  Forced sales of property 
 
From the beginning, we should cross a line between forced sales of the foreign investment 
which are brought about by civil unrest or economic downturns and those brought about by a state 
policy such as the indigenisation of the economy. A state cannot be held responsible for such conduct 
on the part of the foreign investor, unless it has taken measures that affect the investment. But, if the 
unrest is engineered by the host state and the violence is directed at the foreign investors for the 
specific purpose of ensuring that they leave the host state, clearly there is a situation that involves a 
taking. Where the foreign investor abandons the property or makes a quick sale of the property in 
these circumstances, there is no voluntary conduct on his part. The conduct is induced by the state. 
State responsibility could therefore arise in such a situation
14.  
Moreover, where there is racial discrimination that motivates conduct, this gives rise to a 
separate head of liability.  
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Also, some modern investment treaties protect the foreign investor against abuse of the 
process of liquidation
15. The protection usually appears in the treatment provision of the treaty. There 
must be a demonstration that the ordinary process of justice attended the liquidation process and that 
there was nothing that could be seen as a denial of justice. The mere fact that there is a court-ordered 
liquidation may not provide legitimacy to the taking. The court may be used as an instrument to 
effect the taking, in which case, clearly, the liquidation could amount to a taking depending on the 
circumstances
16. 
 
2)  Forced sales of shares in an investment through a corporate vehicle 
 
The question whether there could be diplomatic protection and state responsibility where 
wholly foreign-owned companies incorporated in the host state are taken over has been debated in 
international law. Such companies, incorporated in the host state, have personality only under the law 
of the host state and are corporate nationals of the host state. Many bilateral treaties now contain 
provisions which contemplate the protection of shareholders. Shareholder protection becomes 
important because of the requirement found in host state laws that entry by the foreign investor be 
made through an incorporated joint venture company formed in association with a local entrepreneur 
or state company. The foreign partner will usually be only a shareholder of such a company, and the 
protection of his investment in the company would be on the basis that he is a shareholder. The 
foreign investor or his home state will ordinarily have no standing to protect the company or its 
assets. The only way in which the investment could be protected through international law 
mechanisms is to confer treaty protection upon the shareholding of the foreign investor. The effect of 
this would be that, even where the management of the company is taken over as a result of state 
interference but shareholdings are kept intact, there will be no taking in respect of which the foreign 
shareholder can invoke protection. This will not be an acceptable result from the point of view of the 
foreign investor for the profits of the company may diminish considerably in the absence of a 
vigorous management. It is quite possible that the treaty is widely worded so as to include the right to 
management and control within the definition of an investment, provided the shareholdings were 
such as to create management rights in the foreign investor. In any event, investment treaties usually 
cover contractual rights. This would be so where the foreign investor had made entry through a 
corporate joint venture. The joint venture contract should have provided for such management and 
control rights, in which case they will become protected. Another factor to note is that the 
shareholder protection that has evolved through treaties should not be taken to include portfolio 
investments. However, there are treaties which provide for the protection of portfolio investments. 
On the other hand, since many privatisation measures do not restrict shareholdings by 
foreigners, there are likely to be many foreign investors who have bought shares in foreign privatised 
public companies. Thus, renationalisations can be expected to be effected through forced sales on 
the local stock markets on which the real value of the shares cannot be raised for the obvious reason 
that the sales will be confined to the local investors and there will be a flood of the shares on the 
stock exchange. The question will arise as to whether such forced sales amount to takings or whether 
the situation is akin to one of interference with portfolio investments, in which case the shareholders 
will have to bear the risk of loss or seek remedies provided by the local law. The buying of shares 
during privatisation is more akin to the making of a portfolio investment and the answer, resulting 
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from the analogy, may be that there would be no taking by the state in these circumstances. But, the 
Argentinian cases suggest that, even if there may be expropriation involved, there could be liability 
for violation of treatment standards.  
3) Indigenisation  measures 
 
What do indigenisation measures involve? Well, they involve a progressive transfer of 
ownership from foreign interests into the hands of local citizenry (therefore, there is no vesting of 
any property in the hands of the state or a state organ, there is no direct or even indirect enrichment 
of the government as a result of such measures). This kind of measures were undertaken in many 
Asian and African countries after independence in order to ensure that the termination of political 
control also meant the termination of economic control and the passing of such control into the hands 
of local entrepreneurs. Another possibility is that the foreign investor may remain in control of his 
venture and his control because the local entrepreneurs may lack the skill to run the business as 
efficiently at least in the initial stages. When, eventually, the local shareholders displace the foreign 
managers, the displacement will take place in accordance with the corporate laws of the host state 
and not through any government fiat. Yet, the transfer of the ownership is involuntary and the timing 
of the transfer of the shares in the venture owned by the foreigner is not left to him. As a result, he 
may not be able to secure the optimumprice for his shares. There is no doubt that there is a 
resemblance to forced sales in indigenisation measures. However, foreign investors were content to 
accept it rather than face a protracted dispute with the host state. They reckoned that they would 
come out losers in the dispute and prejudice their continued business prospects in the host state. The 
maintenance of links with the host state was a much prized asset which multinational corporations 
did not want to lose.  
Ethnicity has a role to play in government measures which seek to restructure companies on 
the basis of their racial compositions so as to achieve a measure of economic equity. In Malaysia, the 
bumiputra policy was intended to ensure this, and companies had to restructure in accordance with 
specified ethnic quotas as to shareholdings by each of the races in Malaysia, and foreigners were 
restricted to a percentage of the shareholdings. 
Divestment measures which do not benefit the state directly will not amount to an 
expropriation. 
 
4)  The exercise of management control over the investment 
 
Interference by the state to take over management and control of the foreign investor’s affairs 
is prima facie a taking by the state which should be compensated. The foreign shareholder is entitled 
to such control and management of his investment or property as he pleases, subject to the general 
laws of the host state. The extent of this exception that the regulatory laws of the host state have a 
role to play in the determination of the rights of the foreign investor generates considerable problems. 
The exception may be wide enough, if some views are accepted, to undermine the general rule 
altogether. The exception flows from the fact that the host state has interests to safeguard as far as the 
operation of the investment is concerned.  
In the ELSI Case, when the foreign company contemplated the dismissal of a part of its 
workforce, there was widespread industrial action. The state had an obvious interest in ensuring that 
the dismissals did not lead to unemployment in an already economically depressed part of the 
country. Bankruptcy proceedings that were later instituted prevented the management from 
conducting an orderly liquidation of the company, which may have enabled the foreign company to 
realise a greater value for its assets. Interference in these circumstances in the management and 
control of the company by the host state was held to be justifiable. The state had a compelling 
interest in ensuring that the impact on its economy of the failure of the company was reduced or 826  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Legal sciences 
eliminated. The steps it takes to achieve this objective cannot be considered to be such an 
interference with the foreign investor’s management rights as to amount to a compensable taking. 
Again, a regulatory interference was involved, and the approach of the International Court of Justice 
was not to second-guess whether the interference was necessary. 
5)  Takings by agents and mobs 
 
The rule is that, where there is destruction of property during civil strife or an insurgency, the 
state is liable for the destruction if it failed in its duty to protect the property of the foreign investor. It 
follows that, if there is active participation or instigation of the persons causing the damage by the 
state or its agents, then responsibility for the damage will arise. It is also clear that there must be a 
definite link between the perpetrators of the damage and the state or some attributability of the 
damage to the state through a theory of negligence. These rules have been established through many 
arbitral awards. They have also been stated in the Draft Code of the International Law Commission 
on State Responsibility. The Iran–US Claims Tribunal dealt on several occasions with the situation 
where property was taken or destroyed by mobs. In all these situations, the essential element was the 
establishment of the link between the revolutionary gangs and the new government which emerged. 
In the early stages of the revolution, there were several gangs with which the emerging government 
did not have any links whatever. The Tribunal refused to hold Iran liable for the activities of these 
gangs. But, when the revolution took hold, groups emerged with links to and authority from the state. 
Iran was held liable for the acts of these groups. 
Where the armed forces of a state are involved in a taking of property, the attribution of the 
act to the state is clear. In Amco v. Indonesia, the taking was effected by the army, but the tribunal 
held that there was no attributability, as the army was acting in order to further the interests of its 
own pension fund. In AAPL v. Sri Lanka, there was destruction of property by the army during 
hostilities. Liability was based on the state’s failure to protect the property. In Wena Hotels v. Egypt, 
there was interference by the army.  
Therefore, where the army is involved, the attributability of the act of taking to the state is 
easier to establish. 
 
6)  Interference with property rights 
 
There has been a general tendency in the international protection of alien property to transfer 
domestic norms of property protection into the international sphere. The view that only an outright 
takeover of physical assets amounts to expropriation by a state no longer holds. 
Whereas stress on the physical nature of property was sufficient to protect ownership in times 
when there was a laissez-faire philosophy, the coming of the welfare state meant an increase in the 
nature and frequency of state interference with the ownership of property by individuals. Interference 
with the exercise of property or ownership rights by the host state could amount to takings which 
require compensation. Once the jurisprudential fact that ownership itself involves a bundle of 
intangible rights in relation to property is acknowledged, then it follows that it is not only the outright 
taking of the whole bundle of rights but also the restriction of the use of any part of the bundle that 
amounts to a taking under the law. It is necessary to understand the course of developments relating 
to the concept of property in the municipal systems, in particular of the United States, as the leading 
capital-exporting states will contend for the transference of the system of property protection in their 
domestic sphere into the international sphere. There is evidence of such transference in the past. 
 
7)  Cancellation of permits and licences 
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The cancellation of permits and licences involves a regulatory taking, and has been dealt with 
above in that context. But, where such cancellations are made without due process, are 
discriminatory and violate commitments made regarding their issuance and validity, their subsequent 
withdrawal could amount to a compensable taking. Where licences and permits are necessary to 
operate in certain sectors of the economy and these licences are withdrawn, the foreign investor’s 
ability to conduct his business will be adversely affected. It could be argued that such measures 
involve a taking even if they do not affect the ability of the foreign investor to continue with the 
business or in any way affect the ownership of the property of the foreign investor. In modern 
investment treaties, such licences are protected, as they fall within the definition of investments. 
Where the privilege is revoked, the state is not benefited in any sense. Hence, it would be 
difficult to say that there had been a taking by the state in situations where there is a revocation of a 
licence. However, the foreign investor may have to relinquish his business as a result of such a 
termination and the assets of the business may then vest in some state entity. This will be so where 
the state entity is a partner in the venture with the foreign investor. In the alternative, it may have to 
be sold for a lower price than would otherwise have been the case. In the administrative law systems 
in the common law world, there is generally no review permitted for the revocation of licences, as 
they are privileges the conferment of which is entirely at the discretion of the state. There are many 
awards of arbitral tribunals and claims commissions which have asserted that the withdrawal of 
licences or the imposition of controls do not amount to the taking of property. 
But, the law stated in these older cases must be reviewed in light of new developments. The 
law is increasingly coming to accept that such a withdrawal must not be lightly done without 
warnings to the licensee to desist from the offending behaviour or to fulfil conditions attached to the 
licence. It must be preceded by an opportunity for the licensee to explain why the licence should not 
be withdrawn. The withdrawal of a licence may be considered a regulatory act, particularly where the 
conditions attached to the licence have not been satisfied. But, the substantive right is subject to 
procedural regularity. The proper exercise of the substantive right of revocation for non-satisfaction 
of the condition is not compensable, as it is a regulatory act. But, if it is done without procedural 
regularity, that irregularity gives rise to the duty to pay compensation. Cancellation of licences on 
environmental grounds will become more frequent with the increasing concern for the protection of 
the environment. Such cancellations will often put an end to the foreign investment. They will 
usually not amount to compensable takings.  
In Murphyores Ltd v. The Commonwealth, a concession had been given to two US 
companies for sand-mining on Fraser Island, close to the Great Barrier Reef. The minerals did not 
have a local market. They had to be exported. An environmental study found that the sand-mining 
was harmful to the Great Barrier Reef. The Australian government refused to grant export licences 
for the export of the minerals. This effectively terminated the operations of the companies. The 
Australian High Court rejected the claims of the two companies for compensation on the basis that 
no compensable taking was involved. The Australian government also resisted efforts on the part of 
the home state of the foreign investor to ensure that compensation be paid to the foreign investor.  
Recent awards have emphasised the need for due process safeguards prior to the cancellation 
of licences and have deemed cancellations without due process as violations of treatment standards 
as well as of the expropriation provisions
17. 
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8) Excessive  taxation 
 
As indicated earlier, taxation is within the sovereign power of a state. There is no rule in 
international law limiting the power of a state to impose taxes within its territory. But, ”excessive and 
repetitive tax” measures have a confiscatory effect and could amount to indirect expropriation
18. A 
uniform increase in taxation cannot by itself have such an effect. But, where a foreign investment is 
singled out and subjected to heavy taxation, a clear situation of expropriation can be made out. Such 
a result may not follow where sufficient justification for such taxation exists. The taxing of windfall 
profits (i.e. profits which arise without any act on the part of the investor) cannot amount to a taking. 
Thus, taxation of the oil industry for windfall profits due to price hikes cannot amount to a taking
19. 
Where the situation of excessive taxation is dealt with in investment treaties, the mechanism used is 
joint consultation between the parties to determine whether the excessive tax should be imposed. 
Except in certain obvious circumstances, it is unlikely that a charge of unfair taxation would succeed. 
Many investment treaties deal with taxation separately, requiring that allegations of unfair taxation be 
dealt with through consultation between the two treaty partners. This removes the area from the 
scope of the taking provision in the treaty. 
 
9)  Expulsion of the foreign investor 
 
The expulsion of the foreign investor will amount to a taking if the purpose of the expulsion is 
the taking of his property. But, where national security or other sufficient grounds exist for the 
expulsion, this will be different. Objectively reasonable factors for the expulsion must exist if it were 
to be justifiable on national security grounds. A tribunal which has jurisdiction over the taking on the 
basis that it is a violation of a foreign investment agreement does not have jurisdiction to pronounce 
on the human rights issues involved in the taking. This is a sensible idea, for a tribunal which deals 
with commercial matters is not justified in pronouncing upon disputes that are not commercial in 
nature. 
 
10) Freezing of bank accounts 
 
The freezing of the bank accounts of a foreign investor could amount to a taking of property 
in certain circumstances. Where bank accounts are frozen on the ground that it is necessary to do so 
in order to investigate a crime or a violation of banking regulations, the interference could be 
justified. But, where it is done in the process of an expropriation of the property of the foreign 
investor and as a part of a plan to deny him all his property rights, there is a strong case for the view 
that the freezing of the accounts amounts to a taking. 
 
Having all that in mind, we underline that the taking of foreign property by a state is prima 
facie lawful. Such legality is, however, subject to conditions. The taking of foreign property will be 
lawful only if such taking was for a public purpose and is not discriminatory (a racially 
discriminatory taking is unlawful in international law). The principle against racial discrimination is 
an ius cogens principle of international law. It is odious to international law that nationalisation or 
any act of state should be based on considerations of race. But, please note that a postcolonial 
nationalisation which is designed to end the economic domination of the nationals of the former 
colonial power is exempted from this general rule. Here, nationalisation would be directed at the 
                                                 
18 World Bank, Report and Guidelines (1992) 31 ILM 1375; 
19 See, for the US, Crude Oil Windfall Tax (United States Crude Oil ProfitWindfall Tax Act, 1980, PL 96–
223), upheld in United States v. Ptasynki, 462 US 74 (1983); Laura-Cristiana Spătaru-Negură, Mihai Spătaru-Negură 829 
citizens of a distinct state identifiable by race for the obvious reason that they alone are in control of 
the economic sectors of the nationalising state. A German court accepted the existence of this 
exception when considering the legality of the Indonesian nationalisations. It rejected the argument 
that the nationalisation measures were illegal as they were directed only against Dutch nationals. The 
court emphasised the fact that the Dutch were the colonial rulers of Indonesia and that they had 
control over the Indonesian economy. 
We should bare in mind that there is a duty in international law to pay compensation for the 
taking of alien property. Non-payment affects legality. Moreover, where a taking is done in violation 
of a treaty, the taking will be considered illegal. The Chorzow Factory case concerned a taking in 
violation of a treaty. The view of the Permanent Court of International Justice was that, in 
circumstances of takings in violation of treaties, restitution was the proper remedy for the 
international wrong.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Though the law recognised that there could be takings of alien property other than through 
direct means, the indirect methods of taking have not been identified with any certainty either in 
arbitral decisions or in the literature. It is unlikely that this deficiency of the law will be cured. The 
law on alien takings, especially the law on state responsibility arising from such takings, was 
developed at a time when the state rarely interfered with the marketplace, and interference was 
effected for rather crude purposes such as the self-aggrandisement of ruling elites. It was easy to 
identify and stigmatise such takings as unlawful. Investment protection was facilitated by the 
uniform application of this rule to all types of taking. But, with increasing state intervention in the 
economy, the maintenance of this rule became unacceptable. 
The increasing tendency among both developed and developing countries to control foreign 
investments, albeit through different types of regulatory structures, will keep this issue in the 
forefront of the law in this area. As indicated, this issue has replaced the theory of internationalisation 
of foreign investment contracts and the debate on compensation as the central issue in the area of 
expropriation of foreign investments. But, it is an issue that involves interests that are so inconsistent 
that the challenge of reconciling them would prove difficult.  
So we must ask what the foreign investor who wishes to understand the law on protection 
against expropriation should do? How can a foreign investor know if the host’s state conduct 
affecting the investment is compensated? How can a foreign investor know whether the host’s state 
conduct affecting the investment is compensable? Since the law is indeed in a state of flux, the best 
answer to the question when, how or at what point the valid regulation becomes, in fact and 
effectively an expropriation? should be we will recognize it when we will see it. However, the law 
may provide a basis to answer the question, but the circumstances which determine the question 
remain crucial for the determination. It is obvious that some governmental actions, in some cases, 
almost always, will give rise to indirect expropriation finding cases, and therefore to compensation. 
Other measures, will not. Between the two categories will be the “very brief and hard” are about 
which the famous professor Dolzer was speaking, still full of gaps. 
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